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NO LONGER IN SUSPENSE: CLARIFYING THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
JURISDICTION OF THE SADC TRIBUNAL 
MR Phooko 
1  Introduction  
Over the past decades, apart from the creation of the continental body known as the 
African Union (AU), there has been a proliferation of sub-regional economic 
communities such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC).1 While Regional Economic Communities (RECs) were created 
primarily to deal with economic issues it has been persuasively argued that there is a 
nexus between the objectives of regional integration and the realisation of human 
rights,2 albeit there is contestation of this fact. Each of these sub-regional 
communities has a tribunal that is established in terms of their respective constituent 
documents. These tribunals are the Southern African Development Community 
Tribunal3 (the SADC Tribunal), the Economic Community of West African States 
Community Court of Justice4 (the ECOWAS CCJ), and the East African Court of 
Justice (EACJ).5 The tribunals are instrumental in promoting regional integration on 
the African continent and are therefore responsible, inter alia, for interpreting and 
                                                          
  Moses R Phooko. LLM in International Human Rights Law (University of Notre Dame, USA), LLB 
(Hons), Dip in Human Rights (North-West University, Mafikeng). Former Law Clerk, 
Constitutional Court of South Africa, Advocate of the High Court of South Africa, Senior Lecturer 
and LLD Candidate, Department of Jurisprudence, College of Law, University of South Africa. E-
mail: phookmr@unisa.ac.za. This paper is based on research conducted for my LLD studies 
entitled "The SADC Tribunal: Its Jurisdiction, the Enforcement of its Judgments and the 
Sovereignty of its Member States". My heartfelt appreciation goes to my two year-old daughter, 
Tshiamo Lusseka Refilwe Phooko, who may not understand and/or appreciate the importance of 
this work within the SADC region because of her young age. I hope that one day she will 
understand why I spent a lot of time in the study room at home working on this paper and my 
LLD studies while at the same time accommodating her whenever she asked to help me by 
typing. Thanks are also due to my colleagues, Mzukisi Njotini and Lee Stone, for their valuable 
comments on an earlier draft of this work. All the views and errors are mine.  
1  These were formed under various treaties such as the Treaty Establishing the East African 
Community (1999), which was adopted in 1999 and became operational on 18 July 2010; the 
Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (1975) (hereinafter referred to as the 
Treaty of ECOWAS); and the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (1999), 
(SADC Treaty). See Viljoen International Human Rights Law 488. 
2  Viljoen International Human Rights Law 488, 495-496. 
3  Cowell 2013 HRLR 153. 
4  Alter, Helfer and McAllister 2013 AJIL 737. 
5  Mwinuka Regional Human Rights Systems 3.  
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applying treaty provisions in order to resolve disputes arising from economic 
integration.6 Even though the protection of human rights was not originally within 
their jurisdiction7 through express or implied mandates, they have adjudicated over 
cases involving allegations of the violation of human rights. 
Jurisdiction means the power or competence of a tribunal to adjudicate over a legal 
dispute, and issue a binding judgement.8 The tribunals derive such power or 
competency from a constituent document that defines its power.9 Where the 
instrument is silent about certain powers of the tribunal, the tribunal may decide to 
resort to an implied mandate in order to adjudicate over a legal issue before it. The 
tribunal can do so by considering whether the exercise of such power would be 
necessary to achieve its object and purpose as contained in the constituent 
document.10  
The primary focus of this discourse is the SADC Tribunal, which is the judicial organ 
of the SADC. It was established in terms of article 9(g) as read with article 16 of the  
SADC Treaty. The Tribunal's mandate inter alia is to ensure adherence to and proper 
interpretation of the provisions of the SADC Treaty and its subsidiary instruments, 
and to adjudicate over the disputes that may be referred to it.11 The decisions of the 
SADC Tribunal are final and binding on the parties to the dispute.12 The SADC 
Tribunal did not have the power to compel SADC member states to comply with its 
decisions. Instead, in cases of non-compliance, it had to determine if there had 
indeed been a failure on the part of member state to comply with its ruling. If this 
was so, it had to refer such a case to the Summit for the latter to take appropriate 
action.13 The SADC Tribunal became operational on 22 November 2006. However, 
the challenges against the legitimacy and the extent of the powers conferred upon 
                                                          
6  Viljoen International Human Rights Law 503. 
7  Viljoen International Human Rights Law 485. 
8  Capps, Malcolm and Stratos Asserting Jurisdiction xix; Spencer 2006 U Chi L Rev 617; Rosenne 
Law and Practice 536. For the purposes of this discourse, the words "jurisdiction" and "power" 
are used interchangeably and mean the same thing.  
9  Cheng General Principles of Law 259. 
10  Akade 1998 EJIL 451. 
11  A 2 of the Protocol on Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community (2000) (the 
SADC Protocol on the Tribunal) read with a 16(1) of the SADC Treaty.  
12  See a 16(5) of the SADC Treaty; a 32(3) of the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal. 
13  See a 32(5) of the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal. 
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the SADC Tribunal eventually resulted in its demise. It was consequently suspended 
in August 2010 by the SADC Heads of States and Government.14 This action 
emanated from the SADC Tribunal's decision in the matter of Mike Campbell (Pvt) 
Ltd v Republic of Zimbabwe.15 In this case the SADC Tribunal, through the exercise 
of implied powers, ruled that it had powers and competency to adjudicate over a 
case concerning the allegations of human rights violations.16 This study investigates 
whether the attacks on the SADC Tribunal, as an international organisation, were 
legally warranted and whether the Tribunal acted within its powers when it accepted 
and adjudicated on a case involving human rights abuses. 
For the purposes of a comprehensive analysis of the delimitation of the jurisdiction 
of international tribunals, this paper is composed of five sections. Section I deals 
with the powers of international organisations as conferred on them by member 
states and the exercise of the implied powers that are necessary for the organisation 
to fulfil its objectives. Section II discusses the implied powers of international 
organisations under international law with specific reference to the decisions of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Section III focuses on the exercise of implied powers to 
adjudicate over human rights cases by the EACJ and the ECOWAS CCJ. Section IV 
discusses the exercise of implied powers by the SADC Tribunal in the Campbell case 
and compares it with the decisions of the ECOWAS CCJ, the EACJ and the ICJ. 
Section V provides a conclusion and recommendations.  
                                                          
14  De Wet 2013 ICSID Review 1. Following its suspension in 2011, the new proposals are that the 
envisaged SADC Tribunal will deal only with disputes between member states. See SADC Heads 
of State and Government 2012 http://www.sadc.int/files/3413/4531/9049/Final_32nd_Summit_ 
Communique_as_at_August_18_2012.pdf. 
15  Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd v Republic of Zimbabwe 2008 SADCT 2 (28 November 2008) 
(hereinafter referred to as the Campbell case). 
16  Campbell case 25. 
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2  Jurisdiction of international organisations 
The constitution or treaty establishing an international organisation indicates the 
powers that that organisation possesses and the extent to which those powers are 
to be performed.17 However, it is not always the case that the constituent document 
is precise regarding the powers that an organisation possesses or must have. This 
happens, for example, where the constituent document is silent or ambiguous on 
jurisdictional aspects.  
With specific reference to the SADC Tribunal, the powers that were given to and/or 
exercised by the SADC Tribunal were mainly conferred on it by member states 
through the SADC Treaty and the Protocol on the Tribunal and Rules thereof (SADC 
Protocol on the Tribunal).18 The SADC Protocol was silent on whether or not the 
SADC Tribunal had jurisdiction over human rights cases. This therefore requires a 
detailed discussion of the doctrine of the express and implied powers of international 
organisations.  
2.1  Express powers 
Express powers are those powers that are explicitly conferred upon an organisation 
by state parties. They indicate the nature and the extent to which the powers must 
be exercised.19 According to the doctrine of express powers, an organisation may 
exercise only the powers that are given to it by member states through a constituent 
document.20 In this regard, the SADC Tribunal's jurisdiction is provided for in article 
14 of the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal, which indicates that the Tribunal shall have 
jurisdiction over all disputes that relate inter alia to the interpretation and application 
of the SADC Treaty. The proponents of expressed powers argue that the SADC 
Tribunal can do only what its jurisdictional clause mandates it to do, and that 
                                                          
17  Ebobrah 2008 http://www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/S_Ebobrah.pdf. 
18  Sarooshi 2003 http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/03/030401.pdf. 
19  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ Reports 226 (8 July 
1996) para 25. 
20  Ebobrah 2008 http://www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/S_Ebobrah.pdf. 
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anything outside that would be beyond its mandate.21 In light of the failure of the 
SADC Protocol on the Tribunal to refer emphatically to the competency to deal with 
human rights cases, the question posed by Campbell is relevant: "if an express 
power is given does the definition of that power mean that you cannot exercise 
another similar power which is not expressed?"22 The question arises because what 
is clearly set out in the SADC Treaty and the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal is the 
fact that specific reference is made to the "observance of human rights and the rule 
of law" in the Preamble. Furthermore, the SADC Treaty also requires member states 
to act in accordance with the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law.23 Given this, the question to ask is whether the principles and aspirations that 
are contained in the SADC Treaty impose obligations on member states to respect 
human rights in their respective territories. Alternatively, does the mere reference to 
human rights in the SADC Treaty empower the SADC Tribunal, through implied 
powers, to adjudicate over cases of human rights? These are some of the key 
questions that will be addressed in this discourse.  
2.2  Implied powers 
Implied powers are those powers which, while not explicitly stated, seem to be 
implied by the express powers in a constituent document.24 The theory of implied 
powers was modelled on the constitutional and administrative laws of countries such 
as the United States and England.25 Following this, it was then accepted as a 
principle of international law.26 Hartley, Craig and De Búrca state that the doctrine of 
implied powers can have both a narrow and wide meaning.27 In the narrow sense, 
"the existence of a power implies also the existence of any other power which is 
reasonably necessary for the exercise of the former".28 According to the broader 
meaning, "the existence of a given objective or function implies the existence of any 
                                                          
21  Nkhata 2012 AJICL 97; Johnson 2011 http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/enforcing-judgments-
in-international-law-69044/. 
22  Campbell 1984 ICLQ 524. 
23  A 4(c) of the SADC Treaty.  
24  McCulloch v Maryland 17 US 4 Wheat 316 (1819) 316. 
25  Hartley Foundations of European Union Law 113.  
26  Hartley Foundations of European Union Law 113.  
27  Craig and De Búrca EU Law 123; Hartley Foundations of European Union Law 113.  
28  Craig and De Búrca EU Law 123. 
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power reasonably necessary to attain it".29 Support for the contention that implied 
powers may legitimately be exercised is based on the fact that the application of 
another power is for the purposes of complementing an already existing power, 
function or objective. It can therefore be said that belief in the doctrine of implied 
powers denotes that the tribunal could exercise certain powers even though such 
powers are not contained in its founding document.30 Implied powers are deemed to 
be conferred on the organisation only if they are essential for the performance of 
explicit powers and functions.31 This is an exception to the doctrine of express 
powers which requires that only those powers that are set forth in the constituent 
document should be exercised.32 The doctrines of implied and express powers 
appear to be competing against each other, because the former involves the 
protection of community interest33 while the latter seems to be protective of state 
sovereignty, because it requires the organisation to act within the mandate that was 
given to it by member states.34 It is submitted that these doctrines should not be 
seen as being in conflict with each other but as supplementing each other, as 
implied powers come into play only when express powers do not provide an answer 
to a particular question.  
The resort to the exercise of implied powers by international organisations is not 
without constraints. The test applied to ascertain whether or not an international 
organisation has implied powers is whether the exercise of an implied power is 
necessary for the organisation to achieve its object and purpose as specified in the 
constituent treaty.35 If the answer is no, then an organisation would have acted 
beyond its mandate and the exercise of such a power would be ultra vires. The 
paper now discusses the decisions of international tribunals that have involved the 
exercise of implied powers.  
                                                          
29  Craig and De Búrca EU Law 123; Hartley Foundations of European Union Law 113. 
30  Rama-Montaldo 1970 BYIL 114. 
31  Rama-Montaldo 1970 BYIL 114; Ebobrah 2008 http://www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/S_Ebobrah.pdf. 
32  Ebobrah 2008 http://www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/S_Ebobrah.pdf. 
33  Klabbers Introduction to International Law 6. 
34  Klabbers Introduction to International Law 6. 
35  Akade 1998 EJIL 451; Sarooshi 2003 http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/ 
papers/03/030401.pdf. 
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2.2.1 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion36 
In this case, a number of people had died while they were in the service of the 
United Nations.37 Following their deaths, the General Assembly requested an 
advisory opinion from the ICJ on whether the United Nations had the capacity to 
bring an international claim against the responsible government for the people who 
had died while in the service of the United Nations. This was made with a view to 
obtaining the reparations due in respect of the damage caused to the victims, or the 
persons entitled to such reparation through the victim.38 The court first indicated 
that the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) "does not expressly confer upon 
the Organisation the capacity to include, in its claim for reparation, damage caused 
to the victim or to persons entitled through him".39 It then asked whether or not: 
… the provisions of the Charter concerning the functions of the Organisation, and 
the part played by its agents in the performance of those functions, imply for the 
Organisation power to afford its agents the limited protection that would consist in 
the bringing of a claim on their behalf for reparation for damage suffered in such 
circumstances.40 
The court answered the aforesaid question in the affirmative. It said that under 
international law, an organisation must be construed as being given implied powers 
which are necessary for discharging its duties even if such powers are not expressly 
provided for in the constituent document.41 Since taking this decision the ICJ has 
applied the doctrine of implied powers in other cases.42 Other courts from other 
                                                          
36  Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Advisory Opinion, 1949 ICJ 
Reports 174 (11 April 1949) 174 (hereinafter referred to as the Reparations case). 
37  Reparations case 175. 
38  Reparations case 175. 
39  Reparations case 182. 
40  Reparation case 182. Also see Reparations case 180, where the court said "… the rights and 
duties of an entity such as the Organization must depend upon its purposes and functions as 
specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice". 
41  Reparation case 182. 
42  See for example Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17 para 2 of the Charter) 
Advisory Opinion, 1962 ICJ Reports 151 (20 July 1962) 159 (hereinafter referred to as Certain 
Expenses of the United Nations case); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion, 1996 ICJ Reports 226 (8 July 1996) 226; Competence of the International Labour 
Organisation to Regulate, Incidentally, the Personal Work of the Employer Advisory Opinion, IPCJ 
Series B - No 13 (23 July 1926) 18. 
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jurisdictions have also invoked implied powers, where there are no express powers 
from the constituent document.43 
2.2.2 Certain Expenses of the United Nations case  
The measures undertaken by the United Nations in the 1960s for peace-keeping 
operation purposes in the Congo and the United Nations Emergency Force in the 
Middle East resulted in huge expenditure.44 This caused some members of the 
United Nations to object in that they were not bound by the operations in the 
Congo, amongst others, as the operation had not been undertaken in line with the 
provisions of the UN Charter.45 To this effect, they argued that members of the 
United Nations should not be bound by such obligations.46 The General Assembly 
then requested an advisory opinion from the ICJ on whether certain expenditures 
which had been authorised by the General Assembly to cover the costs of the United 
Nations operations in the Congo and the Middle East constituted expenses of the 
Organisation within the meaning of article 17(2) of the UN Charter.47 The ICJ 
responded inter alia by stating that 
… when the Organisation takes action which warrants the assertion that it was 
appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the objectives of the United Nations, the 
presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization.48 
The ICJ took the flexible approach that the United Nations' General Assembly did 
indeed possess implied powers. As in the Reparations case, the court again 
demonstrated its ability to utilise its interpretative powers by not restricting itself to 
what was contained in a specific clause of the constituent document, but by finding 
that it was necessary to imply that the Organisation had the additional powers 
                                                          
43  See for example Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European 
Communities - European Agreement on Road Transport Case 22-70 (31 March 1971) para 16; 
Wouters and De Man 2009 https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/ 
new_series/wp21-30/wp21.pdf; Sarooshi 2003 http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/archive/ 
papers/03/030401.pdf; Rama-Montaldo 1970 BYIL 124. 
44  Hogg 1962 Colum L Rev 1231. 
45  Hogg 1962 Colum L Rev 1231-1232. 
46  Hogg 1962 Colum L Rev 1232. 
47  Certain Expenses of the United Nations case 152. 
48  Certain Expenses of the United Nations case 168. 
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necessary in order for it to be able to achieve its object and purposes as provided for 
in the founding document.49 
The court's approach is acceptable, and it is argued that it is in line with the 
provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention). 
These require that a treaty be interpreted with reference inter alia to its objectives 
and purposes.50 In addition, the Vienna Convention requires the preamble to any 
treaty to also be considered during the process of interpretation, so that the 
document is considered as a whole, in order to avoid interpreting certain provisions 
in isolation from other parts of the document.51 
This flexible approach is supported, because it provides guidance. It provides 
direction, in that the powers of an organisation that can be shown to be necessary 
for the fulfilment of the organisation's objectives and purposes are deemed to be 
within the competence of that body.52 This is on condition that such powers are not 
expressly excluded.53  
2.2.3  Prosecutor v Duško Tadić54 
After the serious violation of international humanitarian law during the 1990s in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia, the United Nations Security Council (Security 
Council), acting pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, established the ICTY to 
prosecute the accused.55 In creating the ICTY the Security Council acted in terms of 
article 39 of the UN Charter, which had given it powers to determine inter alia the 
existence of a threat to peace or a breach of the peace and to decide what 
measures to take in order to restore peace in accordance with articles 41 or 42 of 
the UN Charter. The Security Council in this instance opted to create the ICTY under 
article 41 of the UN Charter, which is a measure that does not involve the use of 
                                                          
49  Akade 1998 EJIL 446. 
50  Aa 31(1) and (2), and 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331, 
8 ILM 679 (1969). 
51  Fitzmaurice 1957 BYIL 208-209; Rogoff 1996 Am U J Int'l L & Pol'y 590. 
52  Akade 1998 EJIL 446. 
53  Akade 1998 EJIL 446.  
54  Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic aka "Dule" (Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1 
(10 August 1995) (hereinafter referred to as the Dusko Tadic case). 
55  Dusko Tadic case para 19.  
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armed force. Under article 41 of the UN Charter, measures that exclude the use of 
armed force are those that: 
… [M]ay include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, 
sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the 
severance of diplomatic relations. 
The accused filed a preliminary motion challenging the jurisdiction of the tribunal on 
the basis that it lacked the power and the competency to try him.56 The accused 
argued that the actions of the Security Council in creating the ICTY and its statute 
were beyond its (the Security Council’s) powers under articles 41 of the UN 
Charter.57 Further, the accused inter alia argued that the establishment of the ICTY 
had not been envisaged under article 41 of the UN Charter because the examples 
contained therein did not include judicial measures, consisting solely of economic 
and political sanctions.58 The ICTY said that article 41 of the UN Charter on its face 
"does not limit the discretion of the [Security Council] to take measures not involving 
the use of armed force".59 In addition, the ICTY held that Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter confers "very wide powers" upon the Security Council and that there was no 
good reason advanced as to why article 41 should be read as excluding the 
establishment of the ICTY to punish those responsible for atrocities in the former 
Yugoslavia.60 The court therefore dismissed the accused's preliminary motion that 
challenged the jurisdiction of the ICTY. The approach adopted by the court in this 
matter is commendable as it adopted a flexible approach in interpreting article 41 of 
the UN Charter to also include powers of the Security Council to create a tribunal. 
Indeed, the measures listed under article 41 of the UN Charter do not constitute a 
closed list, as the words "may include" imply that other measures that are not listed 
in the provision may also be explored. It is submitted that had the ICTY adopted a 
rigid approach in interpreting the provisions of the UN Charter, this would have 
denied the Security Council an opportunity to deal with something that was well 
within its powers – namely, to restore peace. 
                                                          
56  Dusko Tadic case para 1. 
57  Dusko Tadic case para 1. 
58  Dusko Tadic case para 28.  
59  Dusko Tadic case para 26.  
60  Dusko Tadic case para 27.  
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In light of the above exposition, it is evident that international tribunals have not 
been hesitant to invoke and apply the doctrine of implied powers in order to give an 
organization the power necessary to achieve its objectives and purposes as 
contained in its constituent document.  
3  Jurisdiction of sub-regional courts over human rights in Africa 
The ECOWAS CCJ, the EACJ and the SADC Tribunal have also been confronted with 
cases that required the exercise of implied powers. This is because the constituent 
documents of the aforesaid organisations were silent or not clear with regard to the 
ability of the tribunals to adjudicate over cases involving allegations of human rights 
violations. This part deals with the manner in which each tribunal exercised 
jurisdiction over human rights when the founding treaty was not clear or silent on 
the competency of the tribunal in that regard. 
3.1  The East African Court of Justice 
The EACJ is the judicial organ of the EAC.61 It was created in 1999, and became 
operational in 2001. The jurisdiction of the court is governed by article 27(1) of the 
Treaty Establishing the Community, which gives it competency to interpret and apply 
the provisions of the said Treaty. Other powers such as that of adjudicating over 
human rights cases, will be determined in future by the Council.62 Pending the 
aforesaid determination, the EACJ does not have jurisdiction over issues relating to 
the violation of human rights.63 Despite this, it is submitted that there exists an 
implied mandate in the Treaty Establishing the East African Community which 
empowers the EACJ to receive and adjudicate over cases concerning allegations of 
human rights abuse. This proposition is supported by the court's decision in the 
matter between Katabazi v Secretary General of the East African Community.64 The 
applicants in this case had inter alia been charged with treason. They had therefore 
                                                          
61  See a 9 of the Treaty Establishing the East African Community (1999). 
62  A 9 of the Treaty Establishing the East African Community (1999). 
63  In 2005, a draft protocol was created that was intended to expand the jurisdiction of the court to 
cater for human rights cases, but to date nothing has been finalised. See Mwinuka Regional 
Human Right Systems 7. 
64  Katabazi v Secretary General of the East African Community (Ref No 1 of 2007) 2007 EACJ 3 (1 
November 2007) (hereinafter referred to as the Katabazi case). See also Nyong'o v Attorney 
General of Kenya (EACJ) unreported case number 1/2006. 
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been arrested and remanded in custody.65 The High Court of Uganda had 
subsequently granted bail to some of the accused. Soon after their release, the court 
had been surrounded by security personnel who re-arrested the accused. The 
applicants had then been prosecuted before a military court for similar charges.66 
They had been remanded in prison. The Uganda Law Society had approached the 
Constitutional Court of Uganda and challenged the constitutionality of the 
prosecution.67 The Constitutional Court had declared the detentions unconstitutional 
and had ordered that the accused persons be released. The Government of Uganda 
had failed to honour the court order, and the matter was brought before the EACJ.68  
In the EACJ, the applicants argued that the military charges, continued detention, 
and failure to observe a court order violated articles 6(d), 7(2) and 8(1)(c) of the 
Treaty Establishing the East African Community, amongst others.69 Article 6(d) of the 
Treaty Establishing the East African Community provides that the fundamental 
principles that shall govern the achievement of the objectives of the Community by 
the Partner States includes adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of 
law, and the recognition, promotion and protection of human rights as contained in 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. Under article 7(2) of the Treaty 
Establishing the East African Community, Partner States undertook to "abide by the 
principles of good governance, including adherence to the principles of democracy, 
the rule of law … and universally accepted standards of human rights". Article 
8(1)(c) of the Treaty Establishing the East African Community requires partner states 
to "abstain from any measures likely to jeopardize the achievement of those 
objectives or implementation of the provisions of the Treaty". The Attorney General 
of the Republic of Uganda challenged the court's jurisdiction to deal with human 
rights.70 The basis for this was that the Council had not yet adopted the protocol 
that would have extended the court's power to adjudicate over human rights 
                                                          
65  Katabazi case 1. 
66  Katabazi case 2. 
67  Katabazi case 2. 
68  Katabazi case 2. 
69  The Katabazi case, in particular. The applicants inter alia sought the following order declaring 
that the conduct of the members of the Ugandan Armed Forces who surrounded the High Court 
amounted to an infringement of the Fundamental Principles of the Community in particular 
regard to peaceful settlement of disputes.  
70  Katabazi case 12. 
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cases.71 The court agreed with Counsel to the effect that it had no jurisdiction over 
human rights cases as there was no protocol that has been adopted to 
operationalise its human rights mandate.72 It nonetheless said that: 
[w]hile the court will not assume jurisdiction to adjudicate on human rights 
disputes, it will not abdicate from exercising its jurisdiction of interpretation under 
Article 27(1) merely because the reference includes allegation of human rights 
violation.73  
Therefore, the EACJ assumed jurisdiction and concluded that the intervention by the 
armed security agents of Uganda to prevent the execution of a court order violated 
the principle of the rule of law and the Treaty Establishing the East African 
Community. Furthermore, the court asserted that to uphold Uganda's defence that 
the re-arrest of the accused persons was necessary for security reason would leave 
a "dangerous precedent, which would undermine the rule of law".74 Despite a clear 
absence of jurisdiction75 over human rights, the court opted to extend its powers 
through assuming implied powers to adjudicate over a human rights case by way of 
considering the overall objectives and purposes of the Treaty.76 This decision is 
commendable. It shows the ability of the court to interpret the provisions of a treaty 
in a manner that does not run counter to the promotion and protection of human 
rights. However, it would appear that this decision has received mixed reactions 
from various quarters. Some argue that the court lacks jurisdiction over human 
rights.77 Others are of the view that it is not clear whether the court may exercise 
jurisdiction over human rights matters.78 There are also those who say that it did not 
have express jurisdiction over human rights,79 whereas others are of the view that it 
does not yet have human rights jurisdiction.80 The aforesaid views demonstrate that 
there are some authors who subscribe to the orthodox approach of treaty 
                                                          
71  Katabazi case 12-14. 
72  Katabazi case 14-15. 
73  Katabazi case 16. 
74  Katabazi case 22. 
75  Murungi and Gallinetti 2010 SUR - Int'l J Hum Rts 133; Viljoen International Human Rights Law 
504. 
76  Katabazi case 15-16. See also Gathii 2012 ORIL 262; Viljoen International Human Law Rights 
504. 
77  Ruppel "Regional Economic Communities" 291. 
78  Viljoen International Human Rights Law 504. 
79  Ebobrah 2011 AHRLJ 224. 
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interpretation. This view relies on the fact that only what is contained in the treaty 
may be looked at. The author does not support this approach, as it would restrict an 
organization from fulfilling its mandate. Various provisions, as indicated above, in the 
Treaty Establishing the East African Community require/oblige Member States to 
respect human rights, observe the rule of law and democracy. It is submitted that it 
is inconceivable that the objectives of the EAC can be achieved when fundamental 
principles such as the rule of law, democracy and human rights are undermined. 
Furthermore, under international law the word "principle" refers to binding 
obligations.81 Accordingly, it is submitted that the EACJ acted within its powers when 
it invoked implied powers which are necessary for the organisation to fulfil its 
mandate. There is thus the existence of an implied mandate in the Treaty 
Establishing the East African Community that allows the EACJ to deal with human 
rights cases. This is supported by extensive reference to human rights in the Treaty 
which is written in mandatory terms, including the obligation on Member States to 
undertake to respect human rights. 
3.2 The SADC Tribunal  
The jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal involves the interpretation and application of 
the SADC Treaty, including its protocols and subsidiary instruments, which applies 
within the SADC.82 It can be noted from the description of the scope of its 
jurisdiction that the SADC Treaty and the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal are silent on 
whether the SADC Tribunal can receive and adjudicate cases of human rights 
violations. Despite the absence of express jurisdiction on human rights in these 
instruments, the SADC Treaty does make reference to human rights and other 
fundamental principles such as democracy and the rule of law that a civilised nation 
ought to observe.83 Whether this reference to human rights does in fact constitute 
granting jurisdiction over human rights is what the SADC Tribunal dealt with in the 
matter of Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd v Republic of Zimbabwe.84 This case involved 
                                                          
81  Bartles 2011 http://www.scribd.com/doc/115660010/WTIA-Review-of-the-Role-Responsibilities-
and-Terms-of-Reference-of-the-SADC-Tribunal-Final-Report. 
82  A 16(1) of the SADC Treaty; a 14 of the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal. 
83  Preamble to the SADC Treaty and a 4(c), which requires member states to act in accordance 
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Zimbabwe's controversial land reform policy. The applicants challenged Zimbabwe's 
policy that authorised the expropriation of their farms without compensation. In 
advancing their case, the applicants contended that the acquisition of land without 
compensation breached the government of Zimbabwe's obligations under the SADC 
Treaty to act in accordance with the principles of human rights, democracy, and the 
rule of law, amongst others. The respondent argued that the SADC Tribunal had no 
jurisdiction to adjudicate over human rights cases under the SADC Treaty because 
the Treaty "only sets out the principles and objectives of SADC" not the "standards 
against which actions of Member States can be assessed".85 The respondent further 
contended that that the SADC Tribunal may not borrow the aforesaid standards from 
other instruments as doing so would be tantamount to legislating on behalf of 
states.86 The respondent also argued that there is no protocol dealing with human 
rights or land reform that would give effect to the principles set forth in the SADC 
Treaty.87 Lastly, the respondent argued that the SADC Tribunal may interpret only 
what has already been agreed upon by member states, and therefore, in the 
absence of any set standards that would hold member states accountable, the 
Tribunal appeared to have no jurisdiction to deal with the land reform policy.88 
The SADC Tribunal held that under article 21(b) of the SADC Protocol on the 
Tribunal it had the power to develop its jurisprudence through the use inter alia of 
applicable treaties and rules of public international law. As a result, it could consult 
other sources for answers when the SADC Treaty did not provide any.89 It further 
did not consider it necessary for it to have an additional protocol on human rights 
that would give effect to the principles of the SADC Treaty.90 It therefore relied on 
principle 4(c) of the SADC Treaty which obliges Member States to act in accordance 
with the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law when it 
adjudicated over a case involving human rights violations.91 Accordingly, the SADC 
Tribunal indicated that the aforesaid provision empowered it to deal with any human 
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rights dispute.92 It was apparent that the SADC Treaty, read together the SADC 
Protocol on the Tribunal, the Preamble to the SADC Treaty and the description of the 
objectives and the principles of the SADC Treaty had clearly established the basis for 
its human rights jurisdiction.93 
While the Tribunal's ruling has been the subject of much commentary from scholars 
of international law, who have lauded the progressive decision rendered by the 
SADC Tribunal, the decision has nonetheless also been strongly criticised by certain 
SADC governments.94 It is submitted that the aforesaid decision against Zimbabwe 
eventually resulted in the demise of the SADC Tribunal. The rationale for this 
submission is that the judgement was simply ignored by the government of 
Zimbabwe, even though the SADC Tribunal had submitted several complaints to the 
Summit about Zimbabwe's non-compliance.95 The Summit also did nothing to ensure 
that Zimbabwe complied with the SADC Tribunal's decision. There was more to this 
storm. It is said that Zimbabwe brought a "politico-legal challenge" via a report to 
the Summit questioning the existence, and functioning (including seeking a review of 
the SADC Treaty and the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal) of the SADC Tribunal.96 
This was followed by the Summit's decision of August 2010 which ordered the 
suspension of the SADC Tribunal whilst the review of its functions and terms of 
reference were underway.97 The findings of the review that were prepared by an 
independent consultant found that the SADC Tribunal was properly constituted 
                                                          
92  Campbell case 25. 
93  Cowel 2013 HRLR 5. 
94  For example, President Mugabe has referred to the decisions of the SADC Tribunal as nonsense 
and of no force and effect. Referring to the SADC Tribunal, President Iakaya Kikwete is 
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leaders. See Karlsson et al "International Human Rights" 9.  
95  See for example Louis Karel Fick v The Republic of Zimbabwe 2010 SADCT 8 (16 July 2010) 
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respondent had failed to comply with decisions of the SADC. The domestic court of the 
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96  Ebobrah 2009 AJICL 101. 
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under international law and therefore its decisions should be binding on Zimbabwe.98 
Importantly, the findings by an independent consultant also recommended that the 
SADC Tribunal should be allowed to function.99 The recommendations were ignored. 
Instead, the Summit mandated the Council of Ministers to review the role and 
responsibilities of the suspended SADC Tribunal and its jurisdiction.100 The Council of 
Ministers, in their efforts to produce a report as per the Summit's mandate, met with 
various stakeholders such as human rights activists who were campaigning against 
the suspension of the SADC Tribunal.101 The lobby group's efforts produced positive 
results as most of their recommendations (such as individual access and jurisdiction 
over human rights) were received well by Council Ministers.102 However, the Council 
of Minsters acknowledged that this was no longer a legal issue but a political one.103 
It is said that President Mugabe was also in contact with other Heads of States 
canvassing against the SADC Tribunal on the basis that the decisions of the Tribunal 
were also going to have impact in their territories if it were to be allowed to continue 
working.104 The Council of Ministers' report to the Summit retained a provision 
affording the rights of individuals to have access to the SADC Tribunal but 
recommended that its human rights jurisdiction to be put on hold pending the 
adoption of a separate human rights protocol.105 The Summit rejected the said 
proposals and instead decided to limit the jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal to 
disputes between member states.106 It is in this regard that it has been said that the 
Summit suspended the SADC Tribunal because it had ruled against one of their 
own.107 But one may ask why the Summit reached a consensus (as if in support of 
Zimbabwe) in a process that halted an institution that was meant to uphold the rule 
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of law in the SADC region? The SADC Tribunal was perhaps unfortunate to have 
been confronted with a first case that involved the redistribution of land. Post 
colonialism and because of the dispossession of land from Africans, the issue of land 
reform in countries such as South Africa,108 Zimbabwe109 and Namibia110 remains at 
the top of the political agenda. As a result, measures to address land reform in the 
aforesaid countries began a while ago. Accordingly, if the Campbell decision had 
been enforced in Zimbabwe, its effects would presumably have been felt beyond the 
borders of Zimbabwe, where land reform was actually taking place. There would also 
be huge administrative and practical consequences because of the progress made 
regarding the redistribution of land. To this end, the High Court of Zimbabwe in 
Gramara (Private) Limited v Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe 111 said: 
[SADC Tribunal's decision] ramifications extend to the former owners of all the 
agricultural land that has been acquired by the Government since 2000 in terms of 
section 16B of the Constitution. In effect, enforcement of the decision […] and 
compliance with it generally would ultimately necessitate the Government having to 
reverse all the land acquisitions that have taken place since 2000. Apart from the 
political enormity of any such exercise, it would entail the eviction, upheaval and 
eventual relocation of many if not most of the beneficiaries of the land reform 
programme.  
In the light of this, the author is of the view that because of the current programmes 
that are designed to address identical colonial injustices in the aforesaid countries, 
SADC members showed solidarity and therefore supported Zimbabwe. Further, other 
countries such as Angola, Swaziland and the Democratic Republic of Congo had an 
interest in the demise of the SADC Tribunal because of the poor human rights record 
in their territories.112 The Bushmen in Botswana and the gay people in Malawi would 
also have probably taken their governments to the SADC Tribunal on the bases of 
allegations of human rights abuse. Therefore, they did not wish to be held 
accountable by the SADC Tribunal, which was located outside their countries and far 
from their political influence.113 Finally, it could also be argued that Lesotho voted in 
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support of the Summit decision because it was facing a commercial case that would 
have had potentially far reaching cost implications against the country.114 
In the light of the above exposition, it is pertinent to state that solidarity triumphed 
over the rule of law, as the Campbell decision and other factors ultimately resulted in 
the suspension of the SADC Tribunal, which was viewed as having exceeded its 
mandate or as a threat to state sovereignty.115 
Zenda,116 for example, is also concerned about what he refers to as the "casual 
reference" by the SADC Tribunal to concepts such as democracy, the rule of law and 
human rights, because there are no precise meanings of the aforesaid terms. 
According to him the word "democracy" is a broad political concept that was ill-
suited to be brought before the SADC Tribunal.117 As for the concept of "human 
rights", he states that it is not clear about which rights are referred to, because 
some states are more concerned with economic rights than social and cultural 
rights.118 He is of the view that the SADC Tribunal was incorrect to rely on article 
4(c) of the SADC Treaty as the basis for its human rights jurisdiction, because article 
14 of the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal already sets out the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal.119 Zenda's observation deserves scrutiny. Firstly, the concepts of the rule of 
law, democracy and human rights are interdependent and interconnected.120 In 
other words, one cannot talk about a democratic state if that egalitarian state 
disregards fundamental principles such as human rights and the rule of law, which 
are expected to prevail in such a state. Once the state is regarded as democratic, it 
is submitted that there must be respect for the rule of law and human rights. It is 
conceded that the term "rule of law" is wide in the scope of its application, but it 
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includes the observance of democratic principles such as human rights.121 As for the 
term "human rights" in respect of which he remarks that there is insufficient 
precision as to which rights are to be protected, this observation is untenable. 
Human rights include civil, economic, political and social and cultural rights. All of 
these rights require protection, and no rights should be regarded as being more 
demanding or important than other rights.122 In the light of the above exposition, I 
am unable to agree with Zenda's attacks on the reasoning of the SADC Tribunal. It is 
therefore submitted that it was within the SADC Tribunal's power to grant itself the 
competency to deal with human rights cases by interpreting article 4(c) of the SADC 
Treaty as obliging Member States to act in accordance with the principles of human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law. 
There is a possibility that the omission of the express mandate over human rights 
was a diplomatic omission. This conjecture is supported by the fact that there were 
unsuccessful attempts to grant the SADC Tribunal express mandate over human 
rights in 1997.123 Some authors are of the view that the said proposals were not a 
huge concern at the time, as the SADC Treaty already made reference to human 
rights,124 and to this end human rights already fell within the SADC Tribunal's 
mandate through implication.125 Indeed, it is unthinkable that SADC Member States 
would be able to realise the principles that are set out in the SADC Treaty, such as 
acting in accordance with the principles of human rights and the rule of law, and the 
duty to refrain from taking any measures that are likely to compromise the 
accomplishment of the said standards, if those principles were ignored.126 
Other authors are of the view that even though RECs were created mainly to deal 
with economic issues as opposed to the protection of human rights, there is a link 
between the motives for their objectives of regional integration, such as improving 
the welfare of the people, and the realisation of socio-economic rights.127 Nkatha 
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takes a different stand and argues that the SADC Tribunal avoided a precise and 
deliberate discussion of whether and how it had the power to deal with human 
rights.128 He is of the view that the reasoning of the SADC Tribunal is not convincing 
if one adopts an orthodox interpretation of the SADC Treaty.129 Nkatha's views 
unfortunately fail to expand on how the SADC Tribunal justified its reasoning. It is 
submitted that the SADC Tribunal, through implication, relied on the principles set 
out in the SADC Treaty, such as an undertaking to act in accordance with the 
principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, to assume jurisdiction 
over human rights. The doctrine of implied powers is well known under international 
law as developed further by the ICJ and adopted by other courts such as the ICTY. 
To provide clarity surrounding the Tribunal's human rights jurisdiction, the SADC 
Summit appointed a consultant to study the human rights jurisdiction of the SADC 
Tribunal, amongst other factors, and to provide answers.130 The study revealed that 
under international law, principles refer to binding obligations.131 Bartles further 
highlighted the fact that "[t]he verbal phrase shall act in article 4(c) of the SADC 
Treaty is in the usual language of obligations, and the object of the sentence in 
accordance with the following principles …') is clearly defined".132 As a result, these 
constitute binding obligations and therefore the SADC Tribunal was well vested to 
deal with human rights.133 The consultant therefore found that the SADC Tribunal 
correctly dealt with a human rights case and found no basis for the suspension of 
the Tribunal. The aforesaid recommendations were unfortunately ignored by the 
SADC Summit. This is a major concern and a blow to the SADC region as the SADC 
Tribunal was the only court at a sub-regional level to deal with human rights cases. 
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3.3  ECOWAS CCJ 
The Revised Treaty of the Community of West African States made provision for the 
establishment of the ECOWAS CCJ.134 The ECOWAS CCJ was subsequently created 
by Protocol A/P.1/7/91 and it became operational in 2005. The ECOWAS CCJ was 
initially created to deal with disputes between Member States or between Member 
States and institutions of ECOWAS.135 Member States also have an option to bring 
cases before the ECOWAS CCJ on behalf of their nationals regarding the 
interpretation and application of the provisions of the Treaty.136 It is therefore 
apparent that the protection of individuals' rights is dependent on the mercy of 
states; something that is unlikely to happen because states are generally reluctant to 
litigate against each other. The Afolabi Olajide v Federal Republic of Nigeria case,137 
which involved an allegation of human rights violations, came before the Court. A 
Nigerian businessman instituted action against the government of Nigeria about the 
closure by Nigeria of its common border with Benin. He argued that the closure of 
the border negatively affected his business, and that it was in violation of the 
principle of the free movement of persons and goods as contained in the Revised 
Treaty of Community of West African States and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights. He contended that he had suffered financial damages. The 
defendant objected to the jurisdiction of the ECOWAS CJJ to adjudicate on an 
individual case involving a violation of human rights. The Court ruled that under 
Protocol A/P1/7/91 only Member States could bring cases before it and dismissed 
the application. This decision has been regarded as a blow to the protection of 
human rights.138 However, in 2009 the ECOWAS CCJ made a dramatic and ground-
breaking decision, declaring that all Nigerians are entitled to education as a legal and 
human right, thus concretising the fact that the ECOWAS CCJ is committed to 
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bringing human rights cases within its jurisdiction and is not afraid to declare 
violations of the same.139 
It is submitted that the ECOWAS CCJ adopted a narrow interpretation of the 
instruments establishing the ECOWAS CCJ by relying on the doctrine of express 
powers. Article 4(c) of the Revised Treaty of Community of West African States inter 
alia provides for the "recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples' 
rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights". Therefore, it is submitted, by implication the aforesaid provision 
empowers the ECOWAS CCJ to adjudicate over human rights matters, and recently it 
has not hesitated to do so. 
4  What have the ICJ, SADC Tribunal, ECOWAS CCJ, ICTY and the EACJ 
taught us on implied powers 
International courts such as the ICJ have laid down a foundation of practice 
supporting the contention that implied powers should be exercised as long as they 
are necessary for the fulfilment of the organisations' objectives. Furthermore, they 
should be exercised if there is nothing prohibiting their use in the constituent 
document. Even though the exercise of implied powers was developed by domestic 
courts, they have received support from other major international tribunals such as 
the ICTY, which also resorted to the doctrine of implied powers in the Tadić case. 
Sub-regional courts such as the EACJ and the SADC Tribunal also seized the 
opportunity to exercise implied powers in order to protect and promote human 
rights. Unfortunately, the ECOWAS CCJ then failed to utilise an opportunity that was 
well within its implied powers to protect human rights when it opted not to 
adjudicate over a human rights case. Fortunately, this position no longer prevails as 
the ECOWAS CCJ has more recently adjudicated cases involving allegations of 
human rights violations.140 In the light of the above exposition, it is submitted that 
the SADC Tribunal acted correctly when it resorted to implied powers to interpret 
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and apply the provisions of the SADC Treaty to protect human rights. Further, the 
discussion of other tribunals has indicated that the courts do resort to implied 
powers in order to achieve their objectives when their constituent document is silent. 
It is therefore submitted that implied powers should be used where necessary in 
order to allow judicial organs to fulfil their mandate. An organisation that exercises 
implied powers should elaborate on what led it to act in terms of such powers, 
especially in cases involving the allegation of human rights violations and the 
interpretation of the treaty that is said to be protecting human rights. 
It must nonetheless be conceded that implied powers do not provide the maximum 
protection of human rights, as litigants have the sympathy of the courts in individual 
matters only. It is in this regard that Murungi and Gallinetti have expressed the view 
that even though the exercise of implied powers does not prevent the exercise of 
jurisdiction, a tribunal could be seen as exceeding the mandate originally given to it, 
thus inviting parties to challenge its jurisdiction and delay the proceedings.141 This 
observation has merit, because the decision of the SADC Tribunal in the Campbell 
case was challenged on the basis that the tribunal had no jurisdiction over human 
rights. However, this should not be an excuse because there may be new factors 
that may arise in future which were not foreseen or present when the treaty was 
negotiated and concluded, and it would not be appropriate to refer a treaty back to 
member states for deliberations and clarity on a particular aspect, as that would 
presumably deny justice to those whose human rights are under attack. 
In the light of the above exposition, it may be concluded that the approach taken by 
the SADC Tribunal was in line with the provisions of the Vienna Convention, which 
requires inter alia that a treaty be interpreted in good faith and that words be given 
their ordinary meaning with reference to the objectives and purposes of the 
convention.142 Further, the Vienna Convention requires the preamble of the treaty to 
be considered during the process of interpretation. In other words, a convention 
should not be selectively interpreted but it should be read as a whole.143 Preambles 
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in international law have several functions such as interpretative and supplementary 
roles.144 The motives and aims contained in the preamble can be used to assist the 
reader to understand and interpret provisions set forth in the operative part of the 
treaty.145 The preamble can also inter alia "contain supplementary provisions 
intended to fill the gaps in the treaty by recalling the general principles of law that 
inspired the treaty".146 In some instances, the obligations of member states can also 
be set out in the preamble.147 It was therefore within the powers of the SADC 
Tribunal to use the preamble to the SADC Treaty to search for answers on whether 
or not it had competency to adjudicate over human rights cases. The actions of an 
organisation that can be shown to be necessary for the fulfilment of its objectives 
and purposes are within the competence of that tribunal, as long as they are not 
expressly excluded.148 
5 Conclusion and recommendations 
The foregoing discussion has revealed that there is seemingly a conflict between the 
doctrine of express and implied powers. The former requires tribunals not to resort 
to the application of anything other than what is contained in the constituent 
document. The latter enables a tribunal to go outside of the express powers as long 
as doing so would be necessary for the tribunal to fulfil its object and purpose as set 
out in the founding document. This is, provided that there is nothing prohibiting the 
exercise of the implied powers. But it is submitted that the doctrines of express and 
implied powers should not be viewed as competing against each other. Instead, the 
two should be seen as supplementing each other, because implied powers are 
resorted to only when express powers are silent (and thus do not prohibit the 
exercise of a further power). Furthermore, it is submitted that there is no need to 
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147  See, for example, Appellate Body Report, United States: Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VII, 2755 in which 
the WTO Appellate Body explained that the preamble informs the interpretation of rights and 
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keep waiting in anticipation for the SADC to adopt a protocol or amend the SADC 
Treaty and/or the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal to clarify the Tribunal's human 
rights jurisdiction. 
The SADC Tribunal did not do anything that was prohibited by the SADC Treaty. 
Inter alia it utilised the preambl, as an interpretative and supplementary tool to 
invoke implied powers in order to assert jurisdiction over a human rights case. The 
doctrine of implied powers is well known under international law and other tribunals 
have also used it where they deemed it necessary to achieve their objectives and 
purposes as contained in the constituent document. It is unfortunate that the SADC 
Tribunal was regarded as having acted beyond its mandate when it resorted to 
implied powers. It is submitted that the continued suspension of the SADC Tribunal 
is unwarranted because it did nothing wrong when it invoked implied powers to 
decide a case that involved allegations of human rights abuse. The seemingly 
preferred narrow interpretation of the SADC Treaty by the SADC Heads of State and 
Government has destroyed the first attempt to have a supranational court within the 
SADC region that would have acted as a watch-dog against states that undermines 
human rights in their territories. Ultimately, it is recommended that the SADC 
Summit should lift the moratorium on the SADC Tribunal and allow it to function, 
and that individuals should have access to it. 
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